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1 Introduction
Documenting and assessing real wage cyclicality (RWC) has been a central focus
in economics for a very long time. However, even if a large number of micro stud-
ies find that wages change in a procyclical way, wage cyclicality is found to differ
between alternative wage measures, demographic and personal characteristics as
well as between job stayers and employees who change their job. For instance,
Mitchell, Wallace, and Warner (1985) find heterogeneous behaviour among demo-
graphic groups that are differentiated by age, sex and race. In turn, Bils (1985)
analyses differences between blacks and whites, while Hart (2006) find differences
by gender. In addition, Bils (1985), Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994), Devereux
and Hart (2006), Hart (2006) or Shin and Solon (2007) provide evidence of different
cyclicality among individuals who are moving between employers or in and out of
the work force.
Although some previous studies outline the importance of controlling for com-
position bias, the fact that wage cyclicality may differ among workers throughout
the earnings or/and income distribution has not received enough attention in the
literature. In this paper, we propose that cyclicality can be a heterogeneous pa-
rameter depending on both the changes in the composition of the labour force and
different behaviour in the real wages of each percentile. Although Mitchell, Wallace
and Warner (1985) mention that differences in the employment behaviour of low
and high wage earners can affect the composition of the labour force, and therefore,
the cyclical behaviour of aggregate wages, they do not provide empirical evidence
to back up this hypothesis. The only exception is Swanson (2007), who uses the US
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, finding that although real wages are procyclical
across the entire distribution of workers, the wages of those in lower-income groups
exhibited greater procyclicality. We add to this literature by testing whether, even
for a given labour force composition, the relationship between real wages and the
business cycle can be different among groups. In particular, we are interested in the
heterogeneity that arises across the UK among high- and low-wage/income workers.
Moreover, we also study the presence of asymmetries in the response of income and
wages during times of economic expansion and recession.
We explore this source of heterogeneity by using wave 1 to 18 of the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS). Our analysis is motivated by the fact that, for
many years, the predominant part of the literature was based on the idea that the
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incomes of low-income households were more cyclical than those at the top of the
income scale. The common explanation was that unemployment has the greatest
impact on low-wage workers, thereby affecting their income (Clark and Summers
(1981), Kydland (1984)). However, there is recent literature that suggest the oppo-
site effect. These topical studies suggest that during the past quarter of a century,
the incomes of high-income households have become much more sensitive to aggre-
gate fluctuations than was previously the case. For instance, Parker and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2010) document that the incomes of households in the top 1 percent have
become more than twice as sensitive to aggregate income fluctuations as the income
of the average household in the United States and Canada.
In addition, Swanson (2007), Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) or Piketty
and Saez (2012) suggest that the evolution of top incomes is not exclusively due
to capital or entrepreneurial income. In fact, given that wages and salaries repre-
sent the main share of total income, it follows that wages are also a major source
of the change in cyclicality of top incomes.1 This literature, however, disregards
low-income individuals, and therefore, does not adequately address the relationship
between the business cycle and the entire income distribution.
We go beyond the previous literature by analysing how the business cycle affects
income and wages at different points in the distribution. This allows us to report the
differences between the bottom and the top wage and income groups. Moreover, our
database avoids some drawbacks of the previous studies. First, contrary to Parker
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010), our unit of observation is an individual and not a
tax unit. This is an important advantage because the steady downward trend in
the number of individuals per tax unit over time implies that relying on these units
possess a problem for measuring trends if this ratio changes unevenly across income
groups. Second, instead of working with repeated cross sections, we rely on a panel
of observations. As such, we are able to track changes for a constant population of
individuals and not for groups of households that overlap but are not completely
identical over the years.
We demonstrate that there is a type of heterogeneity that has been largely ig-
1Based on data for the US, Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) show that the income cyclicality
of households in the top 1 percent is roughly similar if one leaves out households with stock options.
Similarly, Piketty and Saez (2012) propose that in 2007, one needs to enter into the top 0.1% for
capital income to dominate wage income. Moreover, if one takes away capital gains, then wage
income dominates capital income at the very top.
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nored in micro-oriented studies. Indeed, our results show that income and wages are
procyclical. Nonetheless, we show that this cyclicality differs across groups. In par-
ticular, cyclicality is stronger for workers who are at the top of the wage and income
distribution. Yet moving to the lower tail of the distribution reveals acyclical income
and wages. We also provide evidence that wage cyclicality are not the same during
economic expansions and recessions. Indeed, whereas income of top-income individ-
uals is roughly the same in expansions and contractions, wages react stronger during
recessions. However, the income and wages of low-income individuals are roughly
acyclical both during times of expansion and during recessions. We reconcile our
findings by showing that an important portion of the acyclicality for low income
individuals is due to the loss of jobs. Another possible explanation for this acycli-
cal income and wages is the role that benefits play in these individuals’ total income.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical methodology.
Section 3 explains the dataset used. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5
concludes.
2 Empirical framework
The starting point of our empirical strategy consists of analysing the cyclical ex-
posure of the different wage and income groups. We follow the literature on wage
cyclicality and regress, for each wage or income percentile, the (log) real wages or
income (x) for the ith worker in year t in the whole sample and by groups as follows:
lnxit = αt + δ
′
1Zi + δ2Ait + δ3A
2
it + it (1)
where αt is the time-variant coefficient (the time-effect), Z is a vector of time-
invariant worker characteristics such as race, gender, years of education, ability, and
motivation; A is the worker’s age as of year t and it is the transitory worker-specific
error term. Following Solon, Whatley, and Stevens (1997), we control for both the
observable and unobservable elements of Z by taking the first-difference in Equation
(1):
∆ lnxit = ∆αt + β
′
Zit + ∆it (2)
where the vector Z contains the worker’s age. To characterise the cyclicality of
the year’s effects on real wages we write the time-variant coefficient as follows:
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αt = γ1 + γ2t+ γ3t
2 + γy lnYt + υt (3)
where t is a linear time trend, Yt is the GDP in year t and υt is the error term.
The quadratic in time is included to account for secular trends. Taking the first
difference of Eq. (3) and substituting in Equation (2) yields:
∆ lnxit = γ2 + 2γ3t+ γy∆ lnYt + β
′
Zit + (∆it + ∆υt) (4)
Equation (4) represents the standard wage cyclicality relationship where γy cap-
tures the cyclical elasticity of income or real wage’s with respect to GDP growth.
Alternatively to the GDP growth, we used the output gap (y − y∗t ) as an indicator
of the business cycle. This measurement allows us to differentiate between economic
expansions and recessions with enough observations in both regimes.2
As noticed by Solon, Whatley, and Stevens (1997), one way to estimate the
cyclical elasticity is to apply ordinary least squares (OLS) to equation (4). However,
if the error terms of different workers in the same percentile are cross-sectionally
correlated, the associated standard error of the OLS estimates would be biased. We
treat the cross-sectional correlation of the error term in equation (4) by applying
generalised least squares (GLS) to Eq. (4), which provides efficient coefficient esti-
mates and consistent standard error estimates.3
3 Data and descriptive statistics
Our analysis is based on waves 1 to 18 (years 1991-2008) of the British Household
Panel Survey (BHPS). The BHPS is a nationally representative sample consisting of
around 5,500 households throughout Great Britain. The panel starts in 1991 with
13,840 individuals being interviewed. The same individuals were followed, as far as
possible, for the subsequent waves of the survey.4
2In the case where the growth rates of time series of interest are predominantly positive (neg-
ative), this may result in a situation where the number of effective observations in the negative
(positive) regime is insufficient for the OLS estimator to be well determined.
3Note that it is also possible to use a two-stage procedure, which is a close substitute for single-
stage GLS. However, the two-stage procedure can yield serially correlated or heteroskedastic error
terms. See Solon, Whatley, and Stevens (1997) for a discussion.
4The BHPS data is available from the Data Archive at Essex University.
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Even though the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) covers only the 1991-
2008 period and the sample is relatively small compared with the Annual Survey of
Hours and Earnings (ASHE), our decision to carry out our analysis on this source is
based on several points. The first one is that we work with income groups. Indeed,
the BHPS covers a stratified random cluster sample of households and provides in-
formation on hourly wage and annual income. Moreover, based on this information,
we are able to decompose income into labour income (pay from current and previous
job), pensions (receipts from non-state pension sources), benefits (all receipts from
state benefits such as retirement pensions and unemployment benefits), transfers
(educational grants, sickness insurance, etc) and interest (income from savings and
investments, and all receipts from rent from property or boarders and lodgers).5
Second, the BHPS provides high quality data at an individual and household level
for labour markets. Therefore, we are able to capture switches from employment to
unemployment as well as reductions in the hours worked by workers who remain in
the labour force.
Moreover, as noticed by Stewart and Swaffield (2002), although the BHPS can-
not compete with the New Earnings Survey (The ASHE replaced the New Earnings
Survey in 2004) or the Labour Force Survey (LFS) in terms of sample size, the BHPS
has advantages over these sources in the context of the measurement of hourly pay.
First, the BHPS does not have the problem of a large number of proxy responses
that the LFS suffers from. Second, interviewers check respondents’ pay slips wher-
ever possible. Third, the BHPS does not suffer from the potentially serious sample
selection bias that exists in the NES, with workers earning below the pay-as-you-
earn tax threshold, who have an above average probability of low hourly pay, being
under-represented in the sample. In the BHPS, regular questions asked in all waves
of the survey lead to hourly pay being constructed in a very similar way to that used
on the LFS. This is the individual’s usual weekly gross earnings (or gross earnings
converted to a weekly basis) divided by total paid hours (basic pay plus paid over-
time) worked in a normal week.
Our sample is restricted to males heads of household between 21 and 60 years
old. We use this restricted sample to avoid several mis-specification issues. First, we
restrict our sample only to males in order to mitigate issues of endogenous female
5Even though the ASHE database considers a longer time-period, and provides very well-
measured wages and large enough samples, it does not contain information on income. Moreover,
it covers employees only. Non employment appears as absence from the data for that year.
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labour market participation. Second, individuals are allowed to enter the panel at
any wave and to re-enter the panel if they exit in previous waves. Such a sample
selection produces an unbalanced panel since not all individuals are present for all
eighteen waves. Movements into and out of the sample may be due to unemploy-
ment, retirement and attrition. An individual has to be present in the sample for at
least two consecutive years in order to be considered in our sample since we work
with the first difference of real income and real wage. Third, our chosen age range
excludes the extremes of the earnings life cycle, where volatility arising just after
labour market entry or before retirement may be confounded with volatility due to
structural labour market changes.6
The main dependent variables are the logarithmic change between two consec-
utive waves in total income and the logarithmic change between two consecutive
waves in the average gross hourly wage, both variables are deflected by the aggre-
gate consumer price index. Hourly wages are calculated as follows:
hw = paygu/(jbhrs× 4.3)
where paygu is the usual gross pay per month in the current job, and jbhrs is the
number of hours normally worked per week.7 We then compute the first difference
of the log of the real hourly wage, which corresponds to:
rhw = (hw/cpi)× 100
where cpi is the consumer price index.
The key explanatory variables are the change in gross domestic product and the
output gap, which are intended to reflect movements in the business cycle. We cal-
culate the first variable as the change in the log in GDP from year t to year t− 1.
6We started with a sample of 115,616 individual year observations. We dropped women from
this sample, which represent the 52.6% of the total observations. From the 54,849 remaining men,
we chose only the 74.5% heads of family (i.e. we kept 40,885 observations). We then eliminated
male heads of family younger than 21 and older than 60 years old. This left us with 38,412 (93.9%
of the previous sample).
7That is, monthly wages are divided by the number of hours worked per week multiplied by the
number of weeks per month (4.3 on average). This is a current way to compute real hourly wages
in the literature (see Stewart and Swaffield (2002) or Rabe (2011)). We do this for those who work
between 10 and 60 hours per week.
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In order to estimate the income and wage cyclicality for different groups, we cal-
culate the percentile in which the individual is placed on the entire distribution of
either wage or income in each wave and consider the percentile to which the individ-
ual belongs at time t. High-wage/income individuals are defined to be those in the
top percentile, and low-wage/income individuals those in the bottom percentile. We
drop the observations placed at the lowest and higher 1% in the distribution in order
to avoid the extremes of the distribution that are usually reported with more errors.8
We also analyse the cyclicality of hours worked for the different groups. The hy-
pothesis behind this exercise is that the adjustment in the labour market might be
through changes in the hours worked rather than due to reductions in wages at the
bottom of the distribution. In this case, we work with two samples. In the first case,
we use the same sample used to study wage cyclicality (i.e. the intensive margin).
However, in the second case we extend the sample to all men in the restricted age
group that ever worked (extensive margin). This allows us to capture movements
from and to unemployment by constructing a balanced panel with 0 hours in the
case an individual is unemployed.
Tables 1 and 2 show some descriptive statistics of important characteristics by
income group: i) the percentage of workers with temporary contracts are higher
among low income groups which are also younger and with a lower level of educa-
tion than workers at the top of the distribution and ii) wages remain close to the
minimum established real wage in the UK for the bottom income group.9 Indeed,
about 8 percent of low income individuals have temporary contracts, compared to
just 3% for the top income. This suggests that low paid workers are easier to fire.
Moreover, according to our data, there is evidence of non-compliance regarding the
minimum wage, with the real hourly wage for the lowest-paid workers remaining
very close to the minimum wage. In particular, the mean of the real hourly wage
for the bottom 10% reached 6.3 pounds in 2008, almost equal to the established
minimum wage (6.2). Yet 6.3 pounds is the mean wage, which implies that many
individuals in this group receive wages below the minimum wage. At first glance,
this non-compliance evidences that there is little or no scope for variation in wage
adjustments in bad labour market conditions for this type of workers.10
8By removing the poorest and the richest 1% we end up with a sample of 37,647 observations.
9To save space, we do not present the statistics according to wage groups.
10The Low Pay Commission Report 2012 provides evidence that 1% of employees in 2008 were
paid less than the national minimum wage in the UK. The evidence of non-compliance is even more
striking for jobs paid less than the then forthcoming minimum wage, representing 5.2% of total
8
Table 1: Average age, percentage of workers with temporary contract and
level of education by income group
Lowest Lowest Top Top
10% 25% 25% 10%
Average age 35.9 37.0 41.9 42.8
Workers with Temporary contracts 7.82% 5.90% 3.34% 3.18%
Higher educational qualification
None 20.3% 22.3% 4.1% 2.8%
Vocational/Technic 5.2% 7.3% 3.8% 2.2%
GCSE-o level 30.5% 31.2% 23.1% 18.3%
A-level/higher education below college degree 23.3% 25.5% 37.4% 34.4%
College/univ degree 20.6% 13.7% 31.5% 42.4%
employees for the same year. By occupations, around 48 per cent of jobs in the cleaning industry,
47 per cent in hospitality, 37 per cent in hairdressing and 34 per cent in child care were paid less
than the minimum wage.
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Furthermore, in Table 3 we show the main sources of annual individual income
by income group. This table documents two main points. First, benefits account for
roughly fifty percent of total income for low income individuals. On the contrary,
these sources of income account for only a low share of total income for the top
10 percent, the main source of income being labour income. This implies that a
main part of the income of low income individuals is, in principle, counter-cyclical
or acyclical. Indeed, while government subsidies (i.e unemployment benefits) tend
to be counter-cyclical, social security transfers do not react to the cycle, probably
because they include large components, such as health and pension payments that
are acyclical and that dominate the cyclical component (E´gert (2010)).
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Second, whereas pensions, transfers and benefits have been steadily decreasing
as a source of total income for the poorest groups since 1991, labour income is
increasing. In contrast, the share of pensions, transfers and interests is increasing
slightly for top income individuals.
4 Results
The top panel of Table 4 presents our main findings in terms of cyclicality for all
the individuals in our sample and for selected groups. In accordance with previous
studies based on micro data, the symmetric business cycle variable (γy) indicates
procyclical income and wages. Indeed, a percentage point rise in the GDP is associ-
ated with an increase in real income and wages of about 0.6% and 0.7%, respectively.
The results with the output gap confirm this cyclicality for the whole sample.
Our first main contribution is in terms of heterogeneity regarding cyclicality
among the different income groups. In this respect, our results show that the real
wages and income of the top earner workers –particularly the top 10% in the income
and wage distribution– are much more responsive to the cycle than lower groups.
In fact, income and wages of the poorests individuals –the lowest 10% and 25%–
are not influenced by movements in the GDP or the output gap.11 Striking though
these results are, they remain partly consistent with the limited previous literature.
Indeed, Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) document that, since 1982, the wage
and salary income of the top 1 percent in the United States has a cyclicality of
2.4, and that of the top 0.01 percent a cyclicality of 6.2, compared with a cycli-
cality of less than 1 for all tax units. Unfortunately, Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2010) do not provide the cyclicality for bottom wage percentiles. We present evi-
dence for the UK –without precedent to the best of our knowledge–that income and
earnings of low-income units are roughly acyclical.12 The only exception is Swan-
son (2007), who also considers the entire distribution of wages and shows that the
wages of lower-income workers exhibited greater procyclicality in the US. However,
he doesn’t explore the asymmetric reaction during expansions and recessions.
11Note that the estimated coefficients for these groups are not significantly different form zero.
12Moreover, we performed the same exercise for the whole sample (including all the male heads
of households). We then excluded only individuals placed at the lowest and highest 1% in the
income distribution and finally we only excluded individuals in the extremes of the earnings life
cycle. Results are presented in Table 7 in the appendix. As seen, the main conclusions are quite
similar.
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Table 4: Cyclicality of real income and wages by income group
All Lowest Lowest Top Top
Elasticity units 10% 25% 25% 10%
INCOME
γ̂y 0.596
(2.62)
0.118
(0.23)
0.546
(0.79)
0.667
(2.15)
1.700
(2.12)
̂γy−y∗ 2.124
(5.65)
1.455
(1.28)
2.035
(1.68)
2.316
(4.71)
2.924
(2.82)
WAGES
γ̂y 0.684
(6.00)
−0.353
(−1.26)
0.482
(1.89)
0.805
(4.04)
1.162
(4.82)̂γy−y∗ 1.562
(8.88)
0.027
(−0.06)
1.041
(2.48)
1.810
(5.09)
2.594
(4.02)
Notes: (1) γ̂y and ̂γy−y∗ are the estimated coefficient for cyclicality according to GDP growth and
output gap, respectively; (2) t-values in parenthesis; (3) Significant coefficients at 10% significance
level are indicated in bold.
So far, we have estimated the global effect of the business cycle. However, these
effects might differ during expansions and contractions. For instance, Hines, Hoynes,
and Krueger (2002) document that the effects of changes in unemployment rates on
earnings are larger in recessions for the United States. Shin and Shin (2008), in
turn, provide evidence that real wage cyclicality among job stayers in the United
States is mainly explained by large wage adjustments during the period when the
unemployment rate reaches a historical minimum level from the start of the em-
ployee’s current job. More recently, Martins (2007) finds evidence that real wages
are considerably more procyclical during recessions than during periods of expansion
in Portugal.
We follow this previous literature by allowing real income and wages to react
differently. This asymmetric reaction can be captured by defining two dummy vari-
ables, D1 and D2, that take the value of 1 for positive or negative values of the
output gap, respectively, and 0 otherwise. We then identify two asymmetric vari-
ables defined as (y − y∗)+t = (y − y∗)t × D1 and (y − y∗)−t = (y − y∗)t × D2, such
that (y − y∗)+t captures the positive component of the output gap and, therefore,
expansions and (y − y∗)−t captures the negative output gap.13 Replacing (y − y∗)t in
13In order to capture asymmetric effects during expansions and recessions, we rely on the output
gap instead of the GDP growth. We do so in order to have enough variation to identify this split.
Decomposing the GDP growth would result in most of the observations pertaining to economic
expansions.
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Equation (4) by its decomposition into positive and negative components, we obtain
the following asymmetric extension of the real wage/income cyclicality equation:
∆ lnxit = γ2+2γ3t+γ(y−y∗)+(y − y∗)+t +γ−(y−y∗)−(y − y∗)−t +β
′
Xit+(∆it+∆υt) (5)
where all the variables were previously defined and (y − y∗)+t + (y − y∗)−t =
(y − y∗)t by definition. Note that (y − y∗)+t (resp. (y − y∗)−t ) takes positive (nega-
tive) values for the positive (negative) component of the output gap, and 0 otherwise.
Hence, the coefficient (y − y∗)+t in Equation (5) will be positive and significant if
we expect wages or income to increase in periods of expansion. Equally, the coef-
ficient (y − y∗)−t will also be positive if they decrease in periods of recession. We
verify the reaction symmetry of the wage cyclicality can be verified with a Wald
statistic testing the null hypothesis assumption that γ(y−y∗)+ = γ(y−y∗)− . If the esti-
mated coefficient for γ(y−y∗)+ is higher than the estimated γ(y−y∗)− , then there is an
asymmetry where expansions have higher impact on real wages than contractions.
We estimate equation Eq. (5) for all the individuals in our sample and for each
wage/income group.
Table 5 presents the results of the previous asymmetric specification. As seen,
the Wald statistic testing the null hypothesis that the estimated rise of wages in
booms is equal to the fall in recessions cannot be accepted at a 5% critical level.
Interestingly, the results show that income is equally sensitive in expansions and
recessions but recessions are particularly harmful for wages of top incomes. Note,
however, that adding asymmetric effects over the business cycle does not change the
acyclicality in the low income group.
What explains the acyclicality of individuals at the bottom end of the wage dis-
tribution? The literature emphasises job mobility as one reason for the different
cyclicality among workers (e.g. Beaudry and DiNardo (1991)). However, Pavlopou-
los, Fouarge, Muffels, and Vermunt (2007) conclude that the probability of job
mobility does not appear to be different for the low and the high paid worker, with
the driving forces of a job change being similar throughout the wage distribution.
We explore an alternative explanation by looking at the adjustments in the hours
worked in each percentile of the income distribution. In particular, given the con-
straints to reduce wages –which are already low– of low wage workers, we analyse
whether hours worked in the bottom income percentiles are more sensitive to the
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Table 5: Asymmetric cyclicality of real income and wages by income group
All Lowest Lowest Top Top
Elasticity units 10% 25% 25% 10%
INCOME
Expansions: ̂γ+y−y∗ 1.822
(3.44)
0.985
(0.71)
1.091
(0.64)
3.267
(5.61)
2.687
(1.87)
Recessions: ̂γ−y−y∗ 2.453
(5.65)
1.828
(1.44)
3.068
(2.08)
1.387
(2.17)
3.115
(2.03)
Symmetry test 0.297 0.545 0.340 0.011 0.841
WAGES
Expansions: ̂γ+y−y∗ 0.832
(3.45)
−0.899
(−1.46)
0.355
(0.63)
1.131
(2.51)
1.878
(3.29)
Recessions: ̂γ−y−y∗ 2.191
(11.02)
−0.998
(−1.18)
1.797
(3.20)
2.502
(5.88)
3.346
(5.04)
Symmetry test 0.000 0.075 0.057 0.000 0.077
Notes: (1) γ̂+y and
̂γ+y−y∗ capture expansions according to the GDP growth and output gap,
respectively; (1) γ̂−y and ̂γ−y−y∗ capture recessions according to the GDP growth and output gap,
respectively; (3) Symmetry test is the probability associated to the null hypothesis that the
estimated coefficient is the same in expansions and recessions; (4) t-values in parenthesis; (5)
Significant coefficients at 10% significance level are indicated in bold.
cycle. The proposition is as follows. Individuals at the bottom percentile are close
to the minimum wage. In contrast to high wages, this means that wages for this
group cannot decrease –or decrease very little– in adverse conditions. Therefore, one
could infer that adverse shocks eventuate in hours worked –or even job losses– rather
than wage adjustments for individuals at the bottom of the distribution. Regarding
income, the main source are pensions and benefits which are, as mentioned before,
acyclic or counter-cyclical. This should explain, in part, the acyclicality observed
for low income individuals.
There are a few studies supporting the proposition that working hours could be
the adjustment mechanism in some cases. For instance, Clark and Summers (1981)
and Kydland (1984) advance that low income households are the most affected by
booms and recessions and that this greater sensitivity is due to the higher cyclicality
of hours worked among this group. In contrast, Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010)
show that the cyclicality of hours only plays a minor role in the cyclicality of the
top 1 percent.
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In order to investigate to what extent the adjustment to the cycle occurs through
employment (hours), we regress the change in average weekly hours on the change
in the GDP and the output gap for the different income groups.14 The cyclicality
of hours is shown in the first panel in Table 6. As seen, the estimated cyclicality is
non-significant for the whole sample as well as for the different percentiles. These
results contradict some previous investigations that find a significant cyclicality of
hours worked for all families but non-significant cyclicality for the top 1% income
in the case of the United States (e.g. Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010)). In
contrast, Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) find that the aggregate hours worked by
individuals with a college degree –which are usually the highest salaried workers–
have become much more procyclical and volatile relative to aggregate output since
the late 1980s.
We explore a further possibility by extending the sample to all the men, in the
restricted age group, that have ever worked. If they do not work in the following
periods, we impute 0 hours worked, constructing a balanced panel. This allows us
to capture switches from employment to unemployment as well as reductions in the
hours worked by workers who remain in the labour force. We refer to this sample
as the extensive margin. The results, presented in Table 6, show that the cyclical-
ity for working hours is significant and positive for the whole sample and for the
different wage groups. For instance, a 1% decrease in the GDP implies a decrease
of about 0.3 hours worked per week, the cyclicality being more important for the
lowest percentile (about 0.7 hours). Remember that there is a high percentage of
these workers who have temporary contracts and are, therefore relatively easy to
hire and fire. This finding may explain why wages are not cyclical for these workers.
Indeed, according to the economic conditions, employers may react to the cycle by
offering more or less working hours to their low income workers rather than higher or
lower wages. We also observe acyclicality of hours worked for top-incomes (at least
respect to the GDP growth), implying that adjustments for this group of individuals
is mainly on the wage/income side rather than hours worked.
Together, our results for hours worked considering the intensive and the extensive
labour margins indicate that negative economic conditions affect low wage workers
mainly through transitions to unemployment, rather than hours worked or wages.
14In this case, we work only with income groups since we include individuals with zero worked
hours and, therefore, zero wages, i.e. the extensive margin.
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These results are in line with Gregg, Machin, and Ferna´ndez-Salgado (2014) who
show that unemployment levels are more important for low and middle earners. Note
that we are treating the intensive and extensive margins differently when studying
the cyclicality of income and hours worked. In the first case, joblessness is treated
as a missing observation in the data and ignored. In the second case, joblessness is
imputed as zero. As such, these workers disappear from our original sample, which
explains why wages are not cyclic for the lowest percentiles. The acyclicality of
income, in turn, is probably explained by the acyclicality of benefits and transfers,
its main components.
Table 6: Cyclicality of hours worked by income group
All Lowest Lowest Top Top
Elasticity units 10% 25% 25% 10%
INTENSIVE MARGIN
γ̂y 0.022
(0.95)
−0.688
(−1.04)
0.076
(0.38)
0.013
(0.40)
0.013
(0.23)̂γy−y∗ 0.009
(0.24)
0.171
(0.16)
0.206
(0.61)
−0.011
(−0.19)
0.001
(0.10)
EXTENSIVE MARGIN
γ̂y 0.319
(5.81)
0.716
(3.81)
0.501
(2.54)
0.068
(0.80)
0.032
(0.23)̂γy−y∗ 1.341
(14.39)
1.163
(2.95)
1.195
(3.60)
1.088
(7.52)
0.779
(4.08)
Notes: (1) γ̂u is the estimated coefficient for cyclicality in Eq. (5); (2) t-values in parenthesis, (3)
The extensive margin includes transition to unemployment (zero working hours); (4) Significant
coefficients at 10% significance level are indicated in bold.)
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5 Final remarks
Micro studies in real wage cyclicality have shed light on several important questions
in the macro-labour literature over the last 20 years or so (e.g. the role of com-
position bias). This paper presents additional evidence of this kind by analysing
the differences in income and real wage cyclicality across income and wage groups.
Using the British Household Panel Survey from 1991 to 2008, we conclude that the
wages and income at the top of the income distribution are more procyclical than
those at the bottom.
We also show that most income reacts symmetrically during recessions and ex-
pansions for the whole population and for the different groups. However, wages for
high-income individuals are specially sensitive in recessions. In fact, this is the case
for all wage groups excepts for those at the first percentile of the wage distribution.
In contrast, we present evidence that income and wages are acyclic for those
at the bottom of the distribution. There are several possible explanations for this
acyclicality. First, the large share of workers in the lowest income/wage groups that
are paid close to the minimum wage explains in part the lack of real wage cyclicality
amongst these groups. Second, there is also considerable cyclicality in hours worked
when allowing for transitions to and from unemployment. Indeed, when considering
the intensive margin, the hours worked are not cyclical. However, when the exten-
sive margin is taken into account, changes in the GDP result in transitions to of
from unemployment rather than decreases in real wages. The high proportion of
low paid workers with temporary contracts probably means that the adjustment to
the cycle is via employment for these workers. Finally, and in contrast to the case
of rich individuals, the main sources of income for low income workers are benefits
and transfers, which are basically counter-cyclic or acyclic.
Finally, our results tend to emphasise that changes in the cycle are not di-
rectly associated with high income and real wage cyclicality for low-income workers.
However, an increase in inequality can be originated through higher unemployment
among these workers. Indeed, if increases in unemployment result in higher poverty
rates, then the cycle increases the share of poor individuals in the total population.
This surely represents a source of income inequality in the long-term.
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Table 7: Robustness checks: Cyclicality of real income and wages by in-
come and wage group for (A) Whole sample; (B) excluding individuals
placed at the lowest and highest 1% in the income or wage distribution
and (C) excluding individuals in the extremes of the earnings life cycle
All Lowest Lowest Top Top
Elasticity units 10% 25% 25% 10%
(A) INCOME
γ̂y 0.245
(4.02)
0.534
(1.01)
1.675
(1.13)
1.720
(4.33)
0.887
(3.74)
̂γy−y∗ 1.511
(3.98)
1.977
(0.78)
2.508
(1.01)
2.294
(4.34)
2.895
(3.25)
(A) WAGES
γ̂y 0.565
(4.87)
-0.407
(−1.53)
0.072
(0.29)
0.681
(3.01)
0.889
(2.85)̂γy−y∗ 1.441
(7.98)
0.090
(−0.16)
0.614
(1.39)
1.823
(4.84)
2.065
(3.43)
(B) INCOME
γ̂y 0.525
(3.75)
−0.434
(−1.41)
−0.647
(−0.57)
0.636
(3.86)
0.516
(3.88)
̂γy−y∗ 2.107
(4.41)
−0.930
(−1.60)
−0.367
(−0.19)
2.537
(4.62)
3.022
(3.16)
(B) WAGES
γ̂y 0.642
(5.74)
−0.379
(−1.29)
0.213
(0.85)
0.804
(4.21)
1.013
(4.22)̂γy−y∗ 1.466
(8.35)
0.117
(0.21)
0.670
(1.59)
1.735
(5.09)
2.168
(4.78)
(C) INCOME
γ̂y 0.420
(4.16)
−1.46
(−0.213)
−0.634
(−1.05)
0.681
(3.78)
0.925
(4.89)
̂γy−y∗ 1.854
(5.63)
−2.655
(−0.98)
0.289
(−0.26)
2.200
(4.26)
2.485
(4.84)
(C) WAGES
γ̂y 0.599
(5.04)
-0.330
(−1.12)
0.320
(1.25)
0.680
(2.85)
0.796
(2.43)̂γy−y∗ 1.537
(8.43)
0.384
(0.08)
0.982
(2.20)
1.929
(4.82)
1.908
(3.01)
Notes: (1) γ̂y and ̂γy−y∗ are the estimated coefficient for cyclicality according to GDP growth and
output gap, respectively; (2) t-values in parenthesis; (3) Significant coefficients at 10% significance
level are indicated in bold.
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